Baltic Security in a Global Context: Challenges, and Collaborations
Episode 1. The Baltics: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania – An overview
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine since February 2022 has shown the seriousness behind the threat of a possible Russian invasion on EU soil. With as primary targets: EU countries that directly border with Russia, such as the Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, Poland and Finland. A potentiality that maybe - although already known by the countries concerned - started to be fully understood by the rest of Europe from this moment. Member states’ attempts to provide a quick and coordinated response following the invasion offered a clear example of this raise of awareness. Among them were the strengthening and adoption of new economic sanctions packages against Russia, the delivery of weapons, military equipment and material to Ukraine within the framework of the European Peace Facility and Ukraine’s Recovery Fund. As well as the increase of national military spending, with Poland, Finland and the Baltic States counting among the first in spending per GDP; and growing investments in the sectors of transport, energy, digitalization, using dedicated funding instruments such as Connecting Europe Facility (CEF).
Undoubtedly, the need to modernize existing infrastructures, to increase transport facilities and defense capabilities as well as to ensure greater energy autonomy, and thus reduce dependence on Russia, has become more pressing. The context is now one where the strengthening of security has become the watchword of European leaders’ priorities - a dynamic particularly visible in the Baltic region’s current developments. In the Baltic countries, transport infrastructure projects and defense are particularly important. Currently, the development of two main projects stand out from others, not only because of the considerable cost they constitute, and the ambition behind their implementation, but for the simple reason that they represent the security dynamics at stake in Europe, reflecting the search towards a more independent and resilient Europe.
Transport - The case of Rail Baltica – A strategic priority for Europe
As part of the Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T) - a network composed of roads, railways, airport and water infrastructures implemented by the EU - Rail Baltica counts among the most ambitious initiatives ever developed in the region: A high-speed, fully-electrified railway infrastructure project, aimed at connecting the Baltics with Poland, integrating them into the European railway system. Stretching over 870 km, it should link the city of Warsaw in Poland, to Tallinn and Pärnu in Estonia, passing through Riga in Latvia, Panevėžys, Kaunas and Vilnius in Lithuania, and end in Helsinki in Finland (via an undersea tunnel, so-called FinEst or Tasinki Tunnel). Due date for the project’s completion: 2030, with the intention to connect the Polish-Lithuanian borders by 2028. The line should cover a length of 392 km in Lithuania, 265 km in Latvia and 213 km in Estonia.
Intended not only for the transport of passengers, the project should also include multimodal freight hubs, in Kaunas in Lithuania, Salaspils in Latvia and Muuga in Estonia, connected to seaports and airports. It should ensure military mobility, by facilitating the transport of heavy material such as tanks or armored vehicles. With a designed speed of 249 km/h for passengers and 120 km/h for freight transport, and the replacement of the inherited Soviet railway system - equipped with a gauge of 1.520 mmm tracks - by ones that meets the European standards - 1.435 mm tracks – the rail infrastructure aims to reduce traffic burdens and allows a significant gain of time when traveling between Baltic States. (For example, the travel time between the capitals Tallinn and Vilnius is expected to be reduced from 7 to 3.5 hours after the completion of the project). In fact, with the adaptation to European gauge tracks, passengers and freight won’t have to be reloaded onto a new train at the Polish border anymore, before continuing into the Baltic region.
Initially, the project was supposed to cover only the EU’s North Sea-Baltic Corridor. But with the adoption by the Council, last June of a revised regulation concerning EU’s guidelines on the development of the TEN-T, the rail infrastructure should now include the Black Sea - Aeagan Sea corridor, by extending to Ukraine. An additional project that for Ukraine represents a further step towards European Integration, in line with the recent opening of accession negotiations. Concretely, this extension would increase Ukraine’s transport capacities and export opportunities. This especially in a context of Ukraine’s heavy reliance on EU’s exchanges, (accounting for 56% of its trade goods in 2023). Moreover, it would also profit its reconstruction efforts.
As such, Rail Baltica – by ensuring better connectivity, swifter mobility as well as a reduced travel time – appears as a strategic tool for increasing NATO’s transport possibilities and defense capabilities, thus enhancing the region’s security.
An ambitious development then – but for which feasibility attracts many concerns. First trains were supposed to be running in 2025, but the project is already 5 years behind schedule, now pushed back to 2030, and should be even more delayed. The main reason for this is a lack of budget among the Baltic States and Rail Baltica’s heavy reliance on new external fundings to ensure its completion (coming from the EU or using alternative solutions, for instance the Private Public Partnership (PPP) model currently being discussed). As of now, Rail Baltica project is financed by 85% by the EU and 15% by the Baltic States.
The estimated cost is fixed at 15.3 billion euros for the first phase of the project (connection of the Baltics to Poland) , with predictions accounting for more than 10-19 billion euros deficit. A cost that projected benefits, — fixed at 6.6 billion euros in direct net benefits, with an expected GDP growth up to 2% and contributing up to 15.5 to 23.5 billion euros of Baltics' GDP — should help to cover, once the project’s completion. Delays are also explained by disagreements over fundings, routing (with the construction of additional intersections), as well as management issues and conflicts of interests, mostly imputed by national governments to LTB company, responsible for the implementation of the project.
Defense - The Baltic Defense Line – One of many defense projects in the region
During a trilateral meeting taking place last January, the three Baltic defense ministers agreed on the construction of the so-called „Baltic Defense Line“, which should stretch along the over 700 kilometer-long border between the Baltic states and Russia. The installation of such a defensive line is part of the already mentioned strategy to improve the defense capabilities in an era of heightened tensions with the big neighbor in the East. Responding to Madrid summit impetus for NATO members to defend their territory from the first meter and to adopt to regional plans, the project aims at securing the Baltics’ and NATO Eastern borders from any ‘potential swift military attacks’.
Included in the project are both the development of a counter mobility plan, as well as the construction of a defense line (both at the surface and in depth), composed of ‘defense posts with reinforced structures and fortification for troops, with various obstacles lines, anti-tank trenches, ammunition and mine storages’. Its objective is to slow down the enemy’s progress by blocking its movement capabilities. The structures will take different forms, such as anti-tank obstacles of reinforced concrete ‘dragon theeths’ or anti-tank mines, and ‘will be blended into the natural terrain’. Explosive cutting wires, mines and engineering equipment will be located in safe storages at the border and should be ready to deploy quickly in the event of a conflict. Each country will separately fund and implement the construction of the defensive lines. For now, Estonia announced the construction of 600 bunkers along its territory by 2025.
Finally, it is worth noting that such project only covers the terrestrial borders of the Baltic States. As such it should be understood in the context of a wider regional defense strategy, involving various actors and including protection systems on land, sea and air. The case of Poland and its so—called East Shield program is part of this dynamic. Its aim is to protect its borders with Belarus and the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad. 10 billion zlotys should be invested in the construction of this comprehensive system of fortifications and barriers scheduled for 2028, which should be connected to the above-mentioned project.