India's perspective on the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)

India's perspective on the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the upcoming SCO Summit in Pakistan

As the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) prepares for its upcoming Heads of Government (HoG) meeting in Islamabad on 15th - 16th October, much of the media attention was focused on whether Prime Minister Narendra Modi will attend. On 4th October, the MEA confirmed external affairs minister Jaishankar’s participation, continuing what is now standard protocol – the foreign ministers from India and Pakistan attending the SCO HoG meetings.  Indian media is now abuzz with the significance of Jaishankar’s trip to Pakistan and what it means for the SCO and India-Pakistan relations. However, this narrow focus on India’s level of participation misses a broader recalibration of New Delhi's engagement with non-Western multilateral institutions like the SCO.

Shifts in India’s approach to non-Western multilateral organizations

Over the past two decades, India has been steadily tilting towards the United States and its Western allies, a shift characterized by a growing preference for pragmatic partnerships and strategic adjustments to India's traditional normative goals. This reorientation, however, doesn't mean India has abandoned its critiques of Western multilateralism. At the core of India's evolving foreign policy is a belief that the current world order is "anachronistic" and operates on an "outdated agenda." For instance, New Delhi believes that any rules-based order must not only be free and open but also equitable and inclusive.

This normative belief played a part in India’s participation in non-Western multilateral organizations like the SCO. New Delhi may have hoped to use these organizations to increase its leverage, maintain strategic autonomy, and work with China and Russia as normative balancers. However, this approach has proven untenable as Beijing is no longer a viable partner for Delhi, and Russia's utility in India's strategic calculus has been consistently diminishing over the past decade, a trend accelerated by the Ukraine war. Consequently, India has reverted to attempting reforms of Western multilateral organizations from within, while simultaneously carving out a new space for itself as a non-Western, democratic leader championing equity in the global order.

India’s experience with the SCO

This shift in India's global engagement strategy has profound implications for its participation in organizations like the SCO. When India joined the SCO in 2017, alongside Pakistan, it had multiple objectives: balancing China's growing influence in Central Asia jointly with Russia, pressuring Pakistan on security-related issues, and enhancing economic connectivity with Central Asia. However, India's experience with the SCO has been largely disappointing on all these fronts.

The SCO's failure to effectively address India's concerns about cross-border terrorism has been particularly frustrating. Despite repeatedly raising the issue within SCO forums, India has seen little concrete action. The organization's Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) has remained focused on extremism in Central Asia and the fallout from the Taliban's takeover in Afghanistan, issues that, while important, do not directly address India's primary security concerns.

Similarly, the promise of enhanced connectivity to Central Asia through SCO mechanisms has yet to materialize. Ambitious projects like the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) and the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) pipeline have made little progress. Even India's investments in Iran's Chabahar port envisioned as a crucial node for Central Asian connectivity, have faced significant hurdles. Further, much to India’s disappointment, Pakistan has increasingly become more relevant to China, Russia, and Iran in conversations about connectivity to Central Asia. India’s efforts to contribute to the SCO through digital public goods have also not resulted in many takers.

In response to these challenges, India has pivoted towards bilateral and smaller multilateral mechanisms to achieve its objectives in Central Asia. The India-Central Asia Summit, first held in January 2022, exemplifies this approach. Through such initiatives, India has established direct engagement at various governmental levels and is funding regional socio-economic projects through its High Impact Community Development Projects (HIICDPs) framework.

India’s relations with Pakistan, China, and Russia

The evolving nature of India's relationships with key SCO members further complicates its engagement with the organization. Russia, once seen as a reliable strategic ally and potential counterweight to China in Asia, has seen its status diminish, particularly following its invasion of Ukraine. There are growing concerns in New Delhi about the deepening Russo-Chinese partnership and Moscow's outreach to Islamabad, developments that undermine Russia's role as a balancing force within the SCO.

India's relationship with China, another key SCO member, has undergone a fundamental reset following border clashes and persistent tensions. This has led to a recalibration of threat perception, accelerated military modernization efforts, and attempts to de-risk strategic economic sectors. The current level of distrust between New Delhi and Beijing is likely to persist for the foreseeable future, limiting India's willingness to engage deeply in any organization where China wields significant influence.

As for Pakistan, bilateral relations remain at a low ebb as exacerbated by the tense security relation. The Indian government has drawn a hard line, and precondition for any form of dialogue. This stance further reduces the utility of the SCO as a platform for India-Pakistan engagement.

An irreversible trend and India’s future in the SCO

Given these developments, India's approach to the SCO and similar non-Western multilateral organizations will likely become increasingly perfunctory. Jaishankar himself has clarified that "I am not going there to discuss India-Pakistan relations. I am going there to be a good member of the SCO". Therefore, India’s recalibration doesn't signify a complete disengagement but rather a realistic assessment of the SCO's limited utility in advancing India's strategic interests, which are now closer to Western multilateralism.

In conclusion, India's evolving approach to the SCO is a microcosm of its broader recalibration of foreign policy priorities. As India continues to navigate the complex geopolitical landscape of the 21st century, it is likely to prioritize partnerships and forums that align more closely with its strategic interests and vision for a more equitable global order. While maintaining its presence in organizations like the SCO, India's focus is shifting towards more effective bilateral and multilateral mechanisms that can deliver tangible benefits in line with its evolving national interests.