Regional Shift
Is Russia Letting Go of the South Caucasus?
Analyzing the Implications of Russian Withdrawal from the Armenian-Iranian Border
The expected withdrawal of Russian border control forces from the Armenian-Iranian border signals a changing security dynamics across the region. It reinstates Armenia’s foreign policy shift, wherein abandoning Russian military protection might further develop closer ties with the West. The balance of power in the South Caucasus will thus be challenged as Armenia gradually assumes control over its border security, while Armenian-Azerbaijani relations and, consequently, Russia’s influence in the region will also be reshaped.
On October 8 in Moscow, an agreement was reached between Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Russian President Vladimir Putin. According to the agreement, as of January 1, 2025, the Armenian National Security Service’s border guard troops will take part in the protection of the Armenia-Iran and Armenia-Türkiye state borders along the existing Russian border guards. Moreover, the Border Guard troops of the Armenian National Security Service will assume full control at the checkpoint on the Armenia-Iran border.[1] This marks a significant shift in Armenia’s security strategy. The decision reflects a growing dissatisfaction with Russia’s lack of effective support for its traditional ally. As Armenia takes over the security of its border, this article examines the implications for regional developments, including Armenian-Azerbaijani relations and the possible role the West could play in this changing landscape.
A Shifting Partnership
Historically, under the terms of their strategic partnership[2], Russian forces have been stationed on the borders Armenia shares with Türkiye and Iran. Recent tensions, however, have strained the relationship. Armenia’s request for Russia to withdraw its troops from several key positions, including Yerevan’s Zvartnots International Airport,[3] points to a broader trend toward national self-assertion and exploration of new alliances. The withdrawal of Russian forces from the Armenian-Iranian border will add not only to the physical control of Armenia over its territory but also somewhat question Russia’s longstanding influence in the region.[4]
What does it mean for Armenia-Azerbaijan relations?
With the Russian withdrawal from the border, tension could likely heighten between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The conflict in 2023 showed Azerbaijan’s willingness to use military force to press its territorial claims aggressively. With Russia’s diminished role as a peacemaker, Armenia will likely be outnumbered in the forthcoming negotiations with Azerbaijan, and with Azerbaijani President’s rhetoric[5], a large-scale military confrontation is not out of the question.
Particularly, without Russian oversight, Azerbaijan’s aspirations for a so-called “Zangezur Corridor,” a direct land link through Armenian sovereign territory to its exclave, are likely to gain momentum.[6] This development raises rightful concerns for Armenia regarding territorial integrity and security, since further escalations are not excluded if Azerbaijan perceives this as an opportunity to score on Armenia’s weakened position.
The West’s Role
For the West, Armenia’s current realignment of its security posture might provide a chance to gain influence in the South Caucasus. Growing military support and political engagement by the likes of the United States and EU members may provide the opportunity to enhance Armenia’s defense capacity against Azerbaijani aggression with less dependence on Russia. The shift would align with greater Western interests looking to balance against Russian influence across the former Soviet space.[7]
Initiatives like the European Union Mission in Armenia[8] reflect the West’s increased commitment to enhance stability along the Armenian-Azerbaijani border and the South Caucasus region in general. It has been crucial in ensuring unbiased and direct reporting to Brussels on the security situation. Moreover, the mission has contributed to the positively changing perceptions among Armenians about the EU, traditionally influenced by Russian narratives. A possible extension of its duration[9] demonstrates the EU and Armenia’s commitment to work closer together, ensuring transparency in the region.
As a key player in the EU, Germany naturally has much at stake regarding stability within the region. Improved bilateral ties with Armenia[10] will facilitate greater economic cooperation and security partnership for democratic governance and regional stability. On the other hand, abandoning Armenia to the whims of fate may make the conflict more unstable.
Conclusion
The withdrawal of the Russian border forces from the Armenian-Iranian border marks a significant turning point in regional geopolitics. While Armenia tries to assume more control over its national security, it continues to face challenges from Azerbaijan and needs to balance its complicated relationship with Russia. The shifting dynamics create both risks and opportunities for Western engagement in the region. Ultimately, how Armenia balances its abiding ties with Russia against new partnerships will shape not only its future but also the broader stability of the South Caucasus.
The diplomatic engagement of Western powers with both parties and simultaneous exploration of non-lethal support to the Armenian military will likely strengthen their influence in the region. A possible cooperation could be provision of border monitoring equipment and training of customs and border guards within the framework of FRONTEX. This approach will help navigate and prevent the risks of growing tension, especially with the Russian withdrawal. Particularly, because enhanced training and resources will allow local authorities to manage the border effectively, ensuring stability. Furthermore, it will encourage Armenia to remain a stable partner in the region in which it can deter potential Azerbaijani aggression.
[1] Armenpress. (2024, October 8). From January 1, 2025, Armenian Border Guard Troops to join protection of Armenia-Iran and Armenia-Turkey borders. Armenpress. https://armenpress.am/en/article/1201798
[2] CIS Legislation. (2024). Contract between Russia and Armenia on the status of the border troops of the Russian Federation which are in the territory of the Republic of Armenia and their conditions... Cis-Legislation.com. https://cis-legislation.com/document.fwx?rgn=25477
[3] Simonian, K. (2024, July 31). Russian Border Guards Leave Yerevan Airport. “Ազատ Եվրոպա/Ազատություն” ռադիոկայան; Ազատություն ռ/կ. https://www.azatutyun.am/a/33058303.html
[4] Atasuntsev, A. (2023, October 13). Long-Standing Ties Between Armenia and Russia Are Fraying Fast. Carnegieendowment.org. https://carnegieendowment.org/russia-eurasia/politika/2023/10/long-standing-ties-between-armenia-and-russia-are-fraying-fast?lang=en
[5] RFE/RL. (2024, November 8). Aliyev Again Warns Armenia Against Armament. “Ազատ Եվրոպա/Ազատություն” ռադիոկայան; Ազատություն ռ/կ. https://www.azatutyun.am/a/33194390.html
[6] Nersisyan, L., & Melkonian, S. (2024, November 12). Escaping Russia’s Backyard: Armenia’s Strategic Defense Shift - APRI Armenia | Applied Policy Research Institute of Armenia. APRI Armenia | Applied Policy Research Institute of Armenia. https://apri.institute/escaping-russias-backyard-armenias-strategic-defense-shift/
[7] Nersisyan, L., & Melkonian, S. (2024, November 12). Escaping Russia’s Backyard: Armenia’s Strategic Defense Shift - APRI Armenia | Applied Policy Research Institute of Armenia. APRI Armenia | Applied Policy Research Institute of Armenia. https://apri.institute/escaping-russias-backyard-armenias-strategic-defense-shift/
[8] EU External Action. (2024). EU Mission in Armenia (EUMA). EEAS. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/euma/eu-mission-armenia-euma_en
[9] ArmInfo. (2024). Arminfo: EUMA: EU Mission in Armenia could be continued. Arminfo.info. https://arminfo.info/full_news.php?id=86583&lang=3
[10] Armenpress. (2024b, October 11). Bilateral defence consultations between Armenia and Germany held in Berlin. Armenpress. https://armenpress.am/en/article/1202082