Baltic Security in a Global Context: Challenges, and Collaborations

Episode 3. The Baltics: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania - An overview

At the occasion of the 43rd Session of the Baltic Assembly and the 30th Baltic Council – which took place on October 17 and 18 in Vilnius, Baltic leaders’ stressed once again the importance of strengthening regional cooperation and security in the Baltic Sea region. Amongst the priorities discussed were the continuing support to Ukraine, increased defense capabilities, greater energy independence as well as the development of secure infrastructures – a set of objectives that remains unchanged, if not reinforced since the 2022 Vilnius declaration. To quote the latter, member states committed to increasing their deterrence and defense against the coercive use of energy and other hybrid attacks by state and non-state actors.

As such, ensuring secure energy supplies has become a central element of Baltic countries’ policies. The Baltic States plan to disconnect their electrical grids from the Russian-Belarusian system, BRELL, on February 9, 2025. They will instead connect to the Continental European (UCTE) system via Poland, marking a significant step towards energy independence. Coupled with that, the rising prices in oil and gas supplies provoked by the war in Ukraine and the imperative to reach out to the 2030 European Green clean energy transition objectives have created the need to invest in new energy sources, such as offshore renewable energy.

Offshore wind farms

The development of offshore wind farms – generating electricity from wind blowing across the sea – is one of these new energy sources.

The Baltic Sea region, with its potential of untapped resources, in terms of offshore wind energy appears of strategic importance. Scientists estimate its capacity up to 93GW – a particularly encouraging number, far beyond the 3GW wind capacity currently used in the region. Indeed, the region’s shallow waters and abundant winds makes it particularly suitable for such a project. Nowadays, already 20 offshore wind farms are implemented in the region, but these are owned only by Denmark, Finland and Germany. Poland is currently constructing its first offshore wind farm "Baltic Power".

In light of these developments, it appears as a natural step for Baltic countries to build their own installations. Such a type of renewable energy is appealing not only for its green transition potential but mostly as it can reduce Baltic countries’ dependencies on electricity imports and ensure lower electricity prices on their national territory.

Indeed, responding to the need for accelerating the phase out of Russian energy by replacing fossils fuels to renewable energy sources, the three Baltic States, with Poland, Germany, Sweden, Denmark and Finland signed the 2022 Marienborg Declaration. They committed to increase their offshore wind production from 3.1 to 19.6 GW by 2030 and agreed on closer collaboration.

As of now, Lithuania should be the first Baltic country to construct its own offshore wind farm, with its so-called "Curonian Nord" project, developed by the green energy company Ignitis Renewables. Planned for 2030, this offshore wind farm will generate a total of 3TWh of green electricity per year – what should meet a quarter of the country’s current electricity needs.  While Estonia has several offshore wind farm projects ongoing – with first constructions planned for 2028, Latvia lags behind. Even though the latter is involved in a joint cross-border offshore wind project "Eldwin" with Estonia, that should be operational for 2035 – its offshore wind industry is still in its early development stages. Moreover, it lacks of a clear national strategy and its ambition targets are considered too low compared to its offshore wind energy potential of 15GW.

While investments in offshore wind power appear as a way for ensuring greater energy transition, the implementations of such projects face some challenges. First, the construction of offshore wind farms is a particular long process, marked by several steps, including obtaining building permits and environmental certificates, which can take up to several years. In May this year, the Estonian Parliament passed an act establishing a superficies license for offshore wind farms. This regulation aims to simplify the administrative process by consolidating various requirements into a single application, thereby accelerating project implementation.

In addition, the need to find investors ready to finance the project is another element to take into account. A lack of bid for auctions can occur, potentially delaying the process. One example lies in investors’ lack of interest for Lithuania’s second offshore wind farm project auction in April 2024, which pushed the country to relaunch a second wind tender in November.

One could also ask about the potential conflict of interests between energy security and the building of defense capabilities. Sweden’s rejection, in the beginning of November this year, of 13 applications for the construction of offshore wind farms is one example. The reason behind such a decision lies in the potential interferences these projects could have on existing defense installations, especially underwater, thus slowing the time of detection in the event of an attack. – This concern is also explained by the direct access to the Baltic Sea of the highly militarized Russian exclave of Kaliningrad, which could also question the Baltics’ room for maneuver for constructing offshore energy infrastructures in the region. The development of new radars, such as air surveillance radars for Estonia’s wind farms aims to mitigate risks raised by interferences.

Another linked issue could have to do with the growing number of hybrid attacks and the need to develop secure energy installations. The recent damages caused to the Baltic connector gas pipeline linking Finland to Estonia in 2023, or more recently, the breaking of an undersea internet cable connecting Finland to Germany on November 18, followed one day later by another cut between Lithuania and Sweden, can attest of it. Looking at offshore wind farms – which are particularly vulnerable due to their remote location – these face significant threats from cyberattacks on wind turbines, with a potential risk of power outrage resulting from it. The case of Germany’s ransomware attacks on Deutsche Windtechnik company’s IT system in 2022 resulted in the loss of control of 2000 wind turbines on 7500 across the country.

Ongoing discussions thus focus on the potential of AI to develop more resilient systems and protect against such risks. Already used by some industries for optimizing maintenance and power distribution or improving offshore wind farms’ design, this technology could be applied on a larger scale, for enhancing cross-border information sharing and creating emergency response plans in case of attack.  

As the topic of AI development was widely discussed during the last 43rd Baltic Assembly and lies among Baltic countries’ national objectives, one could think that its further use in offshore wind digital systems’ is just a matter of time before it comes at the agenda.