Slovakia

On the Path to Illiberal Democracy?

One year after the election and the renewed takeover by Robert Fico, a clear trend towards illiberal democracy is emerging in Slovakia. With his populist agenda and a pro-Russian as well as increasingly authoritarian style of governance, Fico is advancing extensive control over institutions, prompting critics to compare these developments with those in Hungary and Poland under the former PiS government. This comprehensive centralization of power is meeting resistance from civil society, the liberal opposition, and European institutions, who view democratic principles and the rule of law as threatened. Fico is also attempting to silence these voices as effectively as possible.

Following the snap parliamentary elections in September 2023, Robert Fico, the leader of the social-democratic, yet now strongly populist party SMER-SD (Direction – Social Democracy), was appointed as prime minister for the fourth time (with interruptions). The ruling coalition consists of SMER-SD, HLAS-SD (Voice – Social Democracy, the party of the current president Peter Pellegrini), and the SNS (Slovak National Party), which holds positions ranging from right-wing populist to far-right. Since his return, Slovak politics has been marked by dynamic yet polarizing developments, evoking associations for many observers with the pathways to illiberal democracy seen in Poland and Hungary – though the speed and radicalism of reforms in Slovakia are unprecedented. Fico's increasingly authoritarian style of governance is particularly evident in his control over central institutions and a foreign policy heavily aligned with Russia and China, which has raised security concerns within the EU.

Power Takeover and Control of the State Apparatus

Since October 2023, Fico has been systematically reshaping the Slovak state apparatus. On the very first day of his government’s swearing-in, the police leadership was replaced. This was followed by a criminal law reform that, among other things, included the dissolution of the special prosecutor's office for corruption cases and a reduction in penalties for corruption offenses. These reforms have raised concerns within the EU, which even considered freezing its cohesion funds for Slovakia temporarily. Although Slovakia’s Constitutional Court confirmed the constitutionality of these reforms, Fico was forced to make some adjustments under EU pressure, specifically to strengthen protections for the EU’s financial interests. Ultimately, the EU funds were released. However, a series of problematic changes were adopted without modification; the special prosecutor's office no longer exists, and the reduction in penalties for thefts is likely a major reason for the increase in petty crime in Slovakia.

Additionally, the National Criminal Agency (Slovak abbreviation NAKA), which had previously investigated numerous corruption cases involving prominent SMER members, was dissolved. In its place, a new unit for combating organized crime was established. The intelligence service also came under Fico’s control: a politically well-connected head – the son of an SMER deputy – was appointed, without the consent of then-President Zuzana Čaputová. These incidents clearly suggest that political loyalty in the country’s most significant institutions is being prioritized over competence and transparency, crossing a clear line of what is expected from the leadership of a democratic country. Political loyalty and nepotism in key positions within the state apparatus are among the most prominent characteristics of an authoritarian state.

Pressure on Media and Civil Society

A similar trend is emerging concerning media and freedom of expression. Critical voices are increasingly restricted, and independent media are being classified as "hostile actors" and "foreign agents." One example is the private TV station Markíza, which has come under pressure and whose political reporting has been largely neutralized. Political talk shows, like the popular program "Na telo" ("On body") with well-known moderator Michal Kovačič, have been discontinued or restructured; Kovačič publicly expressed before the summer that Slovak media were being “Orbanized.” Shortly after, TV Markíza ended cooperation with him, and the show only returned in the fall with a new moderator who asks fewer critical questions and promotes government-friendly narratives. The state broadcaster RTVS (Radio and Television Slovakia) was also restructured: it was abolished and replaced by the new broadcaster STVR (Slovak Television and Radio), which primarily broadcasts neutral to government-friendly content. This is seen as an attempt to control media reporting in the government’s favor and influence public opinion. Censorship and propaganda – a further clear hallmark of an illiberal, even authoritarian style of governance.

NGOs and representatives of civil society are also facing increasing intimidation. For months, the coalition has been discussing the introduction of a "foreign agent law" modeled after Russia (or, again, after Hungary or Georgia), aimed at requiring organizations receiving financial support from abroad to register, thereby undermining their credibility among the public. Already, many Slovaks distrust NGOs and independent media, with 50 percent of society holding this view, as the latest Globsec Trends study shows. This confirms how effectively the current government has been able to manipulate the population.

Slovak Liberals as a Thorn in Fico's Side

Another significant opponent and threat to Fico’s plans for power are the Slovak liberals, namely the Progressive Slovakia (PS) party. What was recently a small extra-parliamentary movement advocating liberal values in a conservative country has now become the strongest opposition party, breathing down Fico’s neck. In recent polls from November 2024, PS is even in the lead. This trend is likely due in part to the government’s significant tax increases. The base VAT rate will rise from the current 20 percent to 23 percent, and legal entities will be required to pay a tax on financial transactions. Furthermore, PS also won the European Parliament elections in Slovakia with nearly 28 percent of the vote, making it the strongest liberal force in Europe. Led by Michal Šimečka, PS is currently doing a relatively good job of highlighting the authoritarian practices of the current government and debunking government-aligned disinformation.

Due to its influence, PS has become a target of the government: Šimečka was recently removed from his position as Vice-President of the Slovak Parliament, officially due to alleged misconduct by his family, although no evidence exists. The government accused Šimečka's family of misappropriating state funds for personal gain. This government tactic aims to discredit and marginalize political opponents. The government’s attacks on opposition forces, the media, and civil society have intensified since the assassination attempt on Robert Fico in May this year. Fico himself blames the liberals and the media for the escalating political situation in Slovakia. Liberal and progressive values are increasingly portrayed as threats to the Slovak nation, often in connection with the rights of minorities such as the LGBTQIA+ community. The state is promoting a homogeneous political viewpoint centered on national pride, Christian values, and Slovak folklore – a pattern aimed at suppressing political pluralism and minority rights, again a clear characteristic of an illiberal democracy. This trend is also underscored by the recent proposal to amend Slovakia's electoral law by the prime minister. Fico openly states that the number of parties in the Slovak parliament must be reduced, and thus proposes raising the electoral threshold from 5 to 7 percent. A second measure includes increasing the deposit required from parties to run for election from the current 17,000 euros to half a million euros. For a small country like Slovakia, this would be a very stringent electoral law.

Fico’s Foreign Policy Course and Alignment with Russia

Fico's foreign policy sharply contrasts with that of most EU and NATO states, particularly regarding Ukraine and Russia. The government criticizes the EU and NATO for their support of Ukraine and calls for peace negotiations with Russia, inspired by the Hungarian model under Viktor Orbán. High-ranking meetings between Slovak government officials and Russian representatives, such as through the Slovak foreign minister and visits to Moscow by several politicians, signal pro-Kremlin and cooperative intentions. The government emphasizes pursuing an independent and sovereign foreign policy extending to all world regions. It rejects being dictated by external forces on which countries it may partner with, especially resisting any interference from Brussels.

Ľuboš Blaha, an SMER member of the EU Parliament, is prominent as a pro-Russian figure and spreads anti-European and pro-Russian propaganda on social media, as he recently did in a video from Moscow, where he praised Russia for "liberating the Slavs from Western fascism" and criticized the West for "harsh Russophobia." He enjoys enormous reach on social media. Prime Minister Fico recently repeated similar statements in an interview with the Russian propaganda television station Rossiya-1, where he also promised to attend next year’s celebrations of the end of World War II in Moscow. This marks the first such appearance by a head of state from an EU member country since the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Such messages not only undermine European unity and serve Russian propaganda but also contribute to social polarization within the country and weaken trust in the EU. Studies like the Globsec Trends show that Slovaks hold some of the most pro-Russian and anti-Western views in the Central and Eastern European region – 44 percent of Slovaks view the Western way of life and the United States as a threat.

A few days ago, Fico returned from an official visit to China, accompanied by a delegation of around 70 ministers and businesspeople – one of the largest delegations in Slovak history. From the sparse information released about the trip, it appears that China is interested in supporting the expansion of new factories in the automotive sector in Slovakia and investing in infrastructure renovation and construction. Infrastructure is indeed one of the most pressing issues in Slovakia; roads and railways are in dire condition, and the highway network is severely underdeveloped. Fico also expressed his respect for the Chinese regime, emphasizing that he does not intend to interfere in internal matters like human rights abuses, which he expects equally from his Western partners.

This underscores Fico’s true priority: foreign policy is of little concern to him. Fico is an opportunist. He works with those who can serve his domestic political goals. He only says what will gain him favor with the domestic audience. His entire effort is simply focused on consolidating his power within his state. This, too, is a sign of an authoritarian style of government.

Conclusion

Many Slovak experts, including sociologist Michal Vašečka, view Fico as an authoritarian leader whose main goal is the consolidation of power. After more than 30 years in politics, spanning from communism through the controversial government of Vladimír Mečiar in the 1990s to EU accession and the Eurozone, Fico has survived every crisis, including his forced resignation after the journalist murder in 2018, and is now returning more aggressively and populistically. Although his dominance is palpable, he faces strong resistance from the media, civil society, and the opposition. He sees these forces as his main opponents, which underscores his increasingly repressive style. The comprehensive control over media, judiciary, and public institutions indicates that Slovakia is on the path to becoming an illiberal democracy.

Nevertheless, not everything is lost. Slovaks have shown in history that they can eventually stand on the right side, as in the fight to overthrow communism – the Velvet Revolution – whose 35th anniversary Slovakia is about to celebrate in the coming days. The pro-European part of Slovakia places great hope in Progressive Slovakia, which currently appears to be the most reasonable alternative to Robert Fico’s government. The coming years will show whether the resistance in civil society and the European institutions can protect Slovakia’s democratic structure and restore the balance of power.

Barbora Krempaská is a project manager at the FNF Central Europe office in Prague, responsible for Slovakia and Poland.