Belgien

How Belgium’s new multi-party coalition tempers the far-right agenda

The question of how to form stable and decisive new coalitions is becoming increasingly critical for more and more European countries, not only because of the recent exponential growth of the right to extreme-right, but also to an increasing fragmentation of the rest of the political spectrum. Fragmentation often leads to decision paralysis, but also to difficulty in forming coalitions: gathering enough compromise to gain a parliamentary majority is increasingly becoming an obstacle in European democracies, way before it even comes to concrete policymaking. But if it needs to be done, it can be done - Belgium’s new multi-party coalition is a good example of a pragmatic negotiation process where pragmatism where fragmented parties have managed to build bridges over deep ideological divides. How strongly these will hold over the upcoming years remains to be seen, but the making of this coalition can teach a lot about political realism in a fragmented and increasingly conservative-dominated political landscape (for key takeaways, see our fragmented-coalition 101 below).

An unconventional alliance

The composition of the new Belgian government is unprecedented: it is for the first time headed by a conservative Flemish nationalist- Bart De Wever, the leader of Flanders’ New Flemish Alliance (N-VA), and consists of no less than five parties from both major language groups. With the Flemish centre-right (N-VA) and far-right (Vlaams Belang) parties coming out as the winners of the June 2024 national elections, Belgium, or rather Flanders, has clearly taken a huge conservative turn in recent years. However, neither party had even remotely a governing majority, and since N-VA had vouched to keep the cordon sanitaire that has been preventing Vlaams Belang from being considered stating that they would “absolutely not attempt” any coalition talks with the far right, the Flemish Conservatives were only going to head a coalition if negotiations succeeded with several other partners. With all seats combined, the new government coalition makes it to a total of 81 out of 150 seats, forming a small but crucial majority. Negotiations were not easy: they took a total of 234 days, which, ultimately, is not the longest that Belgium has ever taken to form a new government, as much as five parties isn’t the largest amount of parties that have formed a Belgian national government. But while close to nothing is ever simple in Belgian politics, where parties are used to complex identity and authority issues and dissent across political, administrative, and language divides, the country occasionally surprises with exceptional pragmatism and endurance in the face of complicated coalition talks, and the just completed negotiations for the new „Arizona“ coalition government are a prime example. N-VA’s leadership is winged by a lot of centrist forces across language borders: centre-right/liberal francophone Mouvement Réformateur (MR) came out second-strongest, followed by the equally francophone centrists Les Engagés and the centrist Flemish Christians & Democrats (CD&V). Finally, even social-democratic Flemish Vooruit is more centre-left than socialist. For Belgian national politics, this means that this government is well-equipped to align on issues related to economic stability, a more conservative approach to social politics, as well as security. For francophone Wallonia, where MR and Les Engagés have for the first time been forming a centrist coalition in the regional government since mid-2024, it is going to mean a further turn away from traditionally left-leaning political ideology into more political realism. On the other end, the Flemish liberals (Open VLD), lost dramatically to N-VA and Vlaams Belang.

Flemish separatist agenda on hold – for now

N-VA, including Bart de Wever himself, was known in the past for promoting Flemish independence - a vision were the party’s ideology used to come close to the strongly separatist Vlaams Belang. Were Flemish independence ever to be attempted, it would immediately dismantle the Belgian nation state, send French-speaking Wallonia straight into economic breakdown, and severely complicate Brussels’ status as the capital of the European Union and as a major economic hub for working commuters from both Flanders and Wallonia. From an EU institutional perspective, an implosion of the Belgian nation state would cause long-lasting, severe disruptions as most of the EU’s institutions, as well as NATO are technically stationed inside Flemish territory. While de Wever insists that Flemish independence not be turned into a “taboo” under his service as prime minister, he has taken some distance from the Flemish separatist agenda more recently and, despite his repeated criticism of European regulatory frameworks, claims that his party not be considered Eurosceptic or anti-European. Determined to not leave the Flemish independence cause to Vlaams Belang, De Wever has, however, repeatedly indicated that an enhanced autonomy for Flanders, a less invasive approach to regional sovereignty that he calls “confederalism”, is still very much on his political agenda, even though it will no longer be his primary goal, at least for the duration of his leadership of the national government. And much of N-VA’s future stance towards this topic will likely depend on his very own personal judgement, due to his uncontested power status within the party.

Pragmatism trumps fragmentation

The five coalition have successfully managed to identify a strong common incentive: to consolidate economic performance and the Belgian national budget. This focus is helpful as it not an ideologically inflated topic for any of the coalition partners. In general, the new coalition appears rather grounded in political realism. Although conservative-leaning due to N-VA’s strength, the parties have built their agreement on large topics where the necessity to act is so evident that each party’s readiness for consensus is out of the question. Such alignment presents itself not only in national economics but also in the will for reforms towards a stricter migration policy, as well as towards higher security and defence spending. This alignment has certainly helped the coalition parties to overcome scepticism that used to be grounded in ideological differences, which especially the francophone coalition partners had previously nurtured towards the N-VA. But compared to Vlaams Belang’s aggressively nationalist populism, even the N-VA’s flirt with the idea of regional autonomy appears moderate. Hence, the francophone centrists’ immediate openness towards coalition-building with the N-VA, which was mostly unthinkable a few years back. It may have helped that N-VA and MR had previous experiences of working together in the so-called “Kamikaze” coalition under Charles Michel (MR), 2014-2018, although the collaboration failed back then. Another evident, thus pragmatist common goal that the coalition easily aligns on is to contain Vlaams Belang’s far-right agenda. This is going to mean leaning strongly conservative in critical policy fields, first of all migration, in order to convince a high number of Flemish voters that are still strongly supportive of Vlaams Belang’s extreme positions. New reforms in this field may soon turn Belgian migration law into one of the strictest in Europe.

In summary, the new Belgian coalition is a rather economy-oriented coalition that, due to its conservative-leaning orientation, is likely to focus on consolidation rather than innovation. However, seeking economic balance first can be an effective way to tune down ideological agendas from the right. Ultimately, right-wing populists precisely use people’s economic fears for targeted disruption, turning public attention away from grounded approaches that are not distorted by ideological claims.

How to compromise the Belgian way: fragmented-coalition 101

Ultimately, the most interesting takeaway from the Belgian coalition negotiations is the approach that finally led to compromise. Getting five parties onto the same page is hard work. In the Belgian case, parties not only have ideological differences, but also vastly different concerns and responsibilities towards their voters in the very heterogeneous regions of Flanders and Wallonia. In the beginning, the divide over fiscal policy was so big that it looked like there would be no deal at all. Regardless of whether or not there perhaps was some deliberate added drama involved that was meant to heat up the simultaneously running local election campaigns, the five parties ultimately made it work. The following factors are the most informative:

1. Biting through first pays off later: Time is money, also in Belgium, and sometimes more is more. In Belgium, the previous government acts as caretaking government as long as coalition negotiations are not completed. This allows for time to go into great detail, smoothing out misalignment from the get-go, without the need to settle too early for superficial blanket solutions. This can, and it definitely has in the past, backfire when there is not enough external pressure to come to an alignment fast, leading to extremely prolonged and inefficient negotiations. However, this time, there seems to have been the right amount of pressure, especially economic pressure. It was not the fastest round of coalition negotiations of recent terms, but still one of the faster ones, and biting through all the details seems to have payed off.

2. Focusing on less, but “better” issues generates credibility: Pragmatism includes focusing on the big issues first, and accepting that there will be divergence on smaller issues. If the only way to achieve a coalition with a clear majority is through intense compromise, then achieving any form compromise is the only thing that really matters. In the Belgian case, it has helped tremendously to align on fiscal matters, economic performance, and migration reform. There is a bigger spectrum of opinions in smaller topics, but this coalition is unlikely to consider reforms in areas where they aren’t clearly aligned. Perhaps this will be received as realistic by Belgian voters. With voters’ opinions having shifted so much from left to centre (Wallonia) and from centre to right (Flanders), the focus topics selected by the new coalition are precisely what a majority of voters are likely to want to see hands-on interventions in.

3. National economy trumps regional populism: Economic consolidation, which the new coalition has pledged to focus on, is a topic where hard facts can lead a big part of the way. Focusing on these facts could have a unifying effect, as they bring the attention to national-level necessities, where everyone ultimately sits in the same boat. In contrast, populist ideology, especially from the far right, plays out more strongly at the regional level in Belgium. A national-level economic focus might as well help reframe populist agendas more strongly as purely regional issues.

Dr. Nele Fabian is Senior European Affairs Manager at the Regional Office Europe of the Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom in Brussels.

The author would like to thank political historian and Flemish liberal local councillor, Laurenz van Ginneken (Open VLD; ENoP) for his consultation on this article and his insights into Belgian political history.