Intensifying Euroscepticism in East Central Europe
In 2013, Hungarian Republikon Institute undertook a project, funded by the Friedrich Neumann Foundation for Freedom, called ‘Intensifying Euroscepticism in East Central Europe’. The main motivation of the study was the recognition that whereas in some areas a market-oriented, almost "liberal" euro-scepticism has been born, in some other countries, most notably in Hungary, euro-scepticism is a nationalist tool of the right-wing government used to antagonise Hungarians, to turn them more inward and to reach out to far-right, radical voters. The project attempted to measure the different types of euro-scepticism and formulate a strategy for dealing with them − analytically as well as in the public debate.
Attitude towards the EU in EU countries and in Hungary
The reasons for euro-scepticism are extensive; they cannot be described by only one political aspect. First of all, it must be stated that criticism varies from nation to nation according to the member states’ historical, cultural or social development. As an example, while the central criticism in the UK is that integration has violated national sovereignty, critics in Italy believe in the deepening of integration in order to overcome current dysfunctions. Still, aside from the attitudes of individual nations, a pattern can be recognized across member states with similar characteristics. In general, British, Western- and Eastern-European identities are hardly compatible with the universal “European” identity, but there are also other differences. The northern countries criticize the EU for not being able to control the policies of southern countries; at the same time, Mediterranean parties blame the Union for forcing its policies on them. Generally speaking, euro-scepticism involves economic, political and cultural criticism.
Research by a Hungarian institute identified four groups of critics: voters that see the EU as abandoning national sovereignty, ones disappointed by failed economic development, ones not understanding how institutions work and finally, ones disappointed by the recent recession. Another theory deals with “hard” and “soft” scepticism; the former rejects the Union by principle, the latter is dissatisfied only with the institutional system. An example for the former is the UKIP party but it does not stand alone, while examples of the latter are Slovenian or Estonian criticism that defends their countries´ economic development. Some experts also differentiate between scepticism of the principle of the integration and of its benefits in practice. Many factors distort the general perception of the EU – opinions about the EU might change along with opinions of the current government (e.g. in Hungary) and less informed communities are more easily deluded.
By research, the reasons for scepticism can be arranged into three main categories. ‘Democratic deficit’ means that decisions are not made by an elected government, but by unknown institutions. This idea is connected to the violation of national sovereignty and to the widening of the EU’s reach. The third category could be described as uncertainty. It consists of many things – not knowing how the Union works, the sluggish flow of information (and its use by party-politics) or the uncertain reactions to the economic and fiscal problems of today.
These reasons have many easily recognizable political consequences. One is the gradual strengthening of radical, mostly far-right parties. A direct consequence of the 2008 economic crisis was the surprising result of the 2009 EP-election, when radicals from Hungary, Italy, France, Austria, Britain and other countries gained many seats in the EP. Another one is the disinterest in European politics, recognizable in the slowly dropping participation rates in the EP-elections. Scepticism walks hand in hand with attitudes destructive to European solidarity. Populist, anti-elitist, nationalist ideologies strengthen the scepticism and weaken the values of integration, democracy and liberal civil rights, which is especially dangerous in the “young” democracies of Central and Eastern European countries.
Because of the different reasons, it is impossible to find a universal solution but there are partial solutions such as creating a real European government or public sector. If it consisted of truly European parties, democratic sentiment would deepen, since many citizens now do not feel they have any influence on European politics. More cooperation between the EU and member states in policy questions would lower the rate of distrust and the citizens should be directly informed of all this.
The project’s accomplishment – two workshops and a conference, held with well-known Hungarian and international public and political figures - helped the participants gain a deeper understanding of euro-scepticism, both theoretical and practical, and reach the aforementioned conclusions. The project will be completed with a research paper presenting the results in detail.