Peace in South Caucasus

Peace Agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

What did Armenia do?

In the beginning of March, the Republic of Armenia unilaterally accepted Azerbaijan's latest proposals regarding the peace agreement and confirmed the latest text sent by the Republic of Azerbaijan within the framework of "electronic diplomacy". On March 13, the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Azerbaijan separately[i] announced the successful completion of negotiations on a peace agreement[ii]. On the very day this became known, Armenia officially issued a statement calling to begin consultations to determine the place and time for signing the agreement.

Azerbaijan's Response

Just as success seemed imminent, Azerbaijan unexpectedly introduced two preconditions for signing the agreement, while simultaneously accusing Armenia of border shootings. One precondition demands Armenia amend its Constitution, alleging it contains “territorial claims against Azerbaijan.” The word unexpected is deliberately used, as the Armenian Constitution has never been part of bilateral negotiations on peace treaty. Though Azerbaijan has made similar claims before, Armenia views them as groundless. Moreover, the decision of the Armenian Constitutional Court regarding demarcation regulations eliminates all "issues" concerning territorial claims, which Armenia does not have against Azerbaijan in the first place.

Regarding Azerbaijan's other demand about dissolving the OSCE Minsk Group, it is strange to discuss this topic, as Armenia has accepted it, declaring at the highest level that it is ready to jointly apply to the OSCE on this issue either after or simultaneously with the signing of the agreement. Besides, methodologically, not including certain important requirements in the peace agreement negotiations and then presenting the issue in a way that the peace agreement will be signed only upon completing those, is bizarre.

After the peace agreement's completion, Azerbaijan's Defense Ministry claimed border shootings by Armenia from March 16–18, labeling the border "conditional" with Turkic place names and fictitious administrative units. Armenia strongly denied these accusations. The EU Observation Mission in Armenia, in turn, issued a statement noting the absence of any activity on the border. On March 18, the Armenian Prime Minister's Staff issued a detailed statement to restore calm, highlighting the absence of any Armenian directives or motives for border shootings. The statement also reminded Azerbaijan that Armenia had previously proposed border monitoring and incident investigation mechanisms, which Baku ignored. Furthermore, Armenia offered to investigate Azerbaijan’s claims about the March 16-18 incidents if evidence was provided, but received no response. Another mechanism for de-escalation on the border proposed by the Armenian side was the continuation of the demarcation and delimitation process, which remained again unanswered.

International Response

Over 60 states and organizations welcomed the progress and urged the signing of the peace agreement. Highlighting the co-chairs' statements of the Minsk Group is particularly important. French President Macron, in particular, announced that there are no more obstacles on the path to regional peace and development. From Russia, words of support were also voiced at the Foreign Ministry level, simultaneously reminding of the 2021-2022 trilateral agreements between Armenia, Russia, and Azerbaijan. US National Security Advisor Michael Waltz emphasized the need to finalize the peace agreement, release prisoners, and bring peace and prosperity, framing the deal as part of an "American golden age."

Causes for Azerbaijan’s Hesitation to Sign the Agreement

Azerbaijan appears caught off guard by Armenia's agreement to the final points of the peace deal, leading to efforts to delay its signing. This may stem from fears of losing the psychological leverage gained through force or its threat, as well as hopes for future concessions. Delays also align with Azerbaijan’s belief that Russia’s eventual focus on the South Caucasus could secure its broader goals, like an exterritorial corridor. Additionally, internal politics, reliant on anti-Armenian rhetoric, make peace a destabilizing prospect for the Aliyev regime.

The main reason for delay is Azerbaijan's belief that the peace agreement currently offers unequal benefits. For Armenia, peace brings normalized ties with Turkey, stronger Western cooperation, less Russian influence, and development opportunities. Azerbaijan, however, sees no immediate tangible gains. As pro-government Azerbaijani experts state: "This is when the rarely discussed and often overlooked issue of 'dividends of peace' becomes pertinent. As things stand, it is unclear the extent to which Azerbaijan would benefit from 'immediate' peace...". Thus, Azerbaijan expects additional incentives or “calories” for peace, effectively treating the agreement as an auction where new demands emerge if the perceived price is insufficient.

Conclusion

From this moment on, the peace agreement is ready to be signed. This is not a small step, nor a generic framework agreement - this is the big document itself[iii]. All attempts to underestimate this document are dishonest. All attempts to call it a "rapid peace" are incomprehensible because this is a document negotiated for over 4 years and finally agreed upon. Yet, Baku's refusal, additional demands, and hostile rhetoric block progress. Resolving the conflict can stabilize the region, boost development, and close a painful chapter of history. Post-conflict logic and international support are vital to overcoming preconditions and achieving lasting peace. EU’s strengthened commitment following France’s example with more German involvement, and U.S.’s neutral mediation, can transform this fragile moment into lasting stability. Embracing a post-conflict framework will pave the way for economic growth, reconciliation, and the closure of painful historical chapters for both nations.

[i] The separate statements were a consequence of an improper behavior by the Azerbaijani side, which had violated the previously agreed-upon arrangement to issue a joint statement and announced itself first and solely.

[ii] In the English version, the agreement's title is "Agreement on the Establishment of Peace and Interstate Relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan."

[iii] The document clarifies that it only takes effect after domestic ratification, countering recent claims in Armenia and Azerbaijan that it doesn't require signature, or ratification.

Areg Kochinyan is the President of the Research Center on Security Policy, an Armenian think tank specializing in foreign affairs, security, resilience, regional and global politics. Previously, he held leadership positions in state and public institutions, including the Security Council of the Republic of Armenia from 2018 to 2020.

He has participated in hundreds of television, radio, print, and other media interviews and has authored numerous articles, columns, and analyses, including for the Friedrich Naumann Foundation "For Freedom".